Painting by Cheri Samba

Lokuta eyaka na ascenseur, kasi vérité eyei na escalier mpe ekomi. Lies come up in the elevator; the truth takes the stairs but gets here eventually. - Koffi Olomide

Ésthetique eboma vélo. Aesthetics will kill a bicycle. - Felix Wazekwa

Thursday, January 22, 2015

Protests in Kinshasa: Why this time it's different

Courtesy of Manya Riche, @ManyaRiche
The past three days has seen the worst protests in Kinshasa since the controversial elections three years ago. The violence was sparked by a proposed electoral law that links the electoral process to the census, which could delay national elections by several years and illegally prolong President Kabila's stay in power (he has to step down in 2016).

Dozens of protesters have been killed (42, according to FIDH, 20 according to HRW) by the police and presidential guard units, and the government briefly shut down internet, social media, and SMS services across the whole country. Violent protests were also reported in the eastern cities of Bukavu and Goma.

While violence continued in Goma on Thursday, the streets of Kinshasa were calmer and internet service (albeit very slow) had been re-established. The senate met today, but President Kengo wa Dondo said he would give the Political, Administrative, and Legal Commission more time to debate the law before voting tomorrow. 

Will this just be like protests in 2011 and 2012, when despite blatantly rigged elections, protests fizzled out in the face of severe repression? (An essay I wrote about this here). While I think this round of protests is indeed likely to dwindle, there are different dynamics afoot. 

1. Splits within the elite: This is the big change in the past year––not the street protests, but divisions among elites. As Jack Goldstone, an expert on mass mobilization, suggests: "It is a truism that fiscally and militarily sound states that enjoy the support of united elites are largely invulnerable to revolution from below."
That unity now appears to be cracking. The main reason for that is Kabila's term limits. Members of his presidential coalition (including stalwarts like Pierre Lumbi, Olivier Kamitatu, Christophe Lutundula, and Kengo wa Dondo) have all come out publicly against constitutional revisions. More importantly, the governor of mineral-rich Katanga, Moise Katumbi, seems to be parting ways with Kabila, and could rally Katangan heavyweights like Kyungu wa Kumwanza behind him. That would strike Kabila, who is from Katanga, at the heart of his political and military power base, and poses a security threat unlike any of the current opposition members.
Kabila has now backed off a constitutional change to his term limits and seems to be opting for a strategie de glissement (i.e. playing for time). That was the purpose of the proposed electoral law. It now remains to be seen whether this approach––in other words, giving Kabila a few more years in power––will provoke similar internal dissent as constitutional revisions. 
2. A changing protest dynamic: In 2011, the protests centered around UDPS strongholds in Kinshasa––Limete and Masina, in particular. This time, the UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi––who has been in medical treatment in Brussels for months––waited until Tuesday afternoon to weigh in on the protests, and his secretary-general in Kinshasa did not initially throw his weight behind protests organized by other opposition parties.
Instead, students are now playing a much more important role than in 2011. The epicenter of the protests has been at the University of Kinshasa (UNIKIN), which has been stormed by presidential guards and police. There are over 30,000 students at the university, and hundreds of thousands of students across the country. In Bukavu, too, university students were at the forefront of demonstrations organized yesterday. In the past, the political fervor of university campuses has often been tempered when student bodies have been co-opted by political elites. This time that seems to be different.
In general, the protests seems to be more decentralized, lacking one single leader or political organization. Some have also remarked that the relative absence of Tshisekedi and the rise of easterners such as Moise Katumbi and Vital Kamerhe has papered over ethnic tensions that sometimes divide protestors.
The protests also appear to be more targeted: Protesters have attacked Transco buses, which were purchased by the government, looted the office of the head of Kabila's PPRDD party, Evariste Boshab, and were beginning an operation called "Toyebi Ndako" (We Know Your House") that aimed at picketing the houses of MP belonging to Kabila's coalition. Of course, some of the protests also degenerated into looting.  
3. The rise of social media: There is a reason why the government shut down internet and social media across the country. Smart phone ownership has been exploding in the Congo. In the past days, we have seen pictures and videos emerge from across the country of police and presidential guard members firing on protesters. Some of the pictures can be found on this opposition site (warning: some are graphic), others are posted with the hashtag #telema ("stand up") on Twitter. An audio recording of police orders to fire on students has been posted (analysts Jean-Jacques Wondo argues this is police General Célestin Kanyama), and YouTube has been very active (a compilation of amateur videos here). 
So where will this end? It is still unclear. The senate may decide to water down the electoral law, and even take out the controversial language linking the electoral process to the census. Or the backers of the bill could try to steamroll the current version through senate with bribes and threats.

In any case, the fate of the protests lies both in the streets as well as in the political stratosphere. 

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Guest blog: Understanding the recent operations against the FNL/Nzabampema

The following is a guest blog by Judith Verweijen, a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, and at the Conflict Research Group at Ghent University. 

On Monday 5 January 2014, the Congolese military (FARDC) and the South-African contingent of the United Nations' Force Intervention Brigade mounted a surprise attack against a Burundian rebel group operating in Uvira territory (South Kivu) under the name Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL). Deploying no less than nine helicopters, the joint operation soon managed to capture the group’s main bases. The rebels on the run were hunted down over the next days, with some reportedly fleeing into the Itombwe forest and others trying to cross into Burundi.

This offensive was launched as part of the new, robust peacekeeping tactics adopted by the UN, which begs the questions: Who are these rebels, why did MONUSCO attack them, and what are the effects of these operations on the possibilities for dismantling the group altogether?

A brief history of a long rebellion

Factions of the FNL have been operating on Congolese soil for well over two decades. Founded in 1980 as Palipehutu by political activists in exile who had fled the mass killings of Hutu under the Micombero government in 1972, the group was initially based in refugee camps in Tanzania. Its main objectives were to end Tutsi domination of Burundian state institutions and security services, and to fight against the exclusion of the Hutu peasantry. It launched its first attack on Burundian soil in 1991, and became one of the main belligerents of the civil war that broke out after the assassination of president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. By that time, the group, which profited from support of the Rwandan Habyarimana government, had split, with the main faction operating under the name Palipehutu-FNL.
It was in the course of the Burundian civil war that the group set up shop on Zairian (as the Congo was then called) territory, being partly based in the Burundian refugee camps that had sprung up in the Ruzizi Plain (Uvira territory) following the 1993 violence. The Plain, a wide expanse of savannah adjacent to the Rukoko reserve in Burundi––where the FNL had important bases––was a convenient location for the group. During the two Congo Wars (1996-2003), Palipehutu-FNL collaborated with the various Mai Mai forces active in Uvira, in particular those under commander Nakabaka, although it was less actively involved in the Congolese wars than the other Burundian Hutu insurgent movement, the CNDD-FDD. Additionally, the FNL continued their collaboration with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the forerunner of the FDLR, including by operating jointly in Burundi. However, due to important differences in operating style and ideological orientation, this collaboration largely ended in 1998, allegedly after the FNL had sent ex-FAR/Interahamwe (then called ALiR2) troops into operations that were destined to fail. Since then––and importantly, given the operations that took place this past week––relations between the various incarnations of the two Hutu groups have been relatively distant, although there has been low-level collaboration.
Refusing to sign the 2000 Arusha peace agreement, Palipehutu-FNL continued to fight when a transitional government was formed in Burundi, also declining participation in the 2005 elections. It was only in 2009 that it laid down arms, formally transforming into a political party under the name of FNL, since the ethnic reference in Palipehutu was considered unconstitutional. Former military and political chief Agathon Rwasa became the head of the party, and a part of the fighting forces was integrated into the Burundian security services. Up to that point, the group had continued activities in the Ruzizi Plain, where there were also many FNL deserters mainly active in banditry. FNL fighters operated and lived in a dispersed fashion, with a number of combatants having married local women. Collaboration with Mai Mai groups continued, allegedly including during the infamous 2004 attack on a Congolese refugee camp in Gatumba claimed by the FNL, although there is still a lack of clarity on how this attack was organized and who exactly was involved.
Due to the deteriorating political climate in Burundi during the 2010 electoral cycle, including large-scale irregular killings of FNL and other opposition members, and alleged fraud with the local elections, Rwasa and other major opposition leaders, like Alexis Sinduhije of the MSD, decided to go underground. Both Rwasa and Sinduhije become involved in insurgent activities in South Kivu, with Rwasa reanimating the FNL’s military branch, placed under the leadership of Antoine “Shuti” Baranyanka. They established bases in both Uvira and Fizi territory, collaborating with numerous Mai Mai groups, like the Fuliiru groups of Baleke, Nyerere, Fujo and Bede Rusagara in Uvira, and the Bembe Mai Mai of Yakutumba and Mayele in Fizi. The expansion into Fizi allowed the group to increase its involvement in trade networks with Tanzania, which functions as a crucial logistical hub and a source of recruits from among the refugee camps. However, the group also re-recruits numerous demobilized ex-FNL and some ex-FDD fighters from Burundi, and has been joined by ex-FNL defectors from the Burundian army (FDN). This group includes a certain major Aloys Nzabampema, who became the second in command during this period.
This renewed FNL activity led the FDN to step up its activities against the group in the course of 2011, including by establishing an unofficial presence in Kiliba, a small town on Congolese territory in the Ruzizi Plain, close to the border with Burundi. From there, it has conducted limited operations against the FNL, often in retaliation to attacks. However, the Burundian army has not ventured into mountains, where the group has established its main bases. The FARDC also undertook a number of efforts to address the group militarily, but these were limited, with most attention in the course of 2012 being absorbed by fighting M23-allied groups in Fizi/Uvira, such as Bede. However, this began to change after Rwasa’s withdrawal from direct involvement in military activities at the end of 2012. Meanwhile, rifts within the FNL military leadership became accentuated due to differences in political orientation, in particular regarding whether Rwasa should resume political activities in Burundi, and organizational and personal issues.

The birth of FNL/Nzabampema

In January 2013, these tensions came to a head, leading to a definite split between a pro-Rwasa wing under Shuti and a pro-Nzabampema wing. Shuti withdrew from active command, establishing himself with his deputy Major Evelyne in the hills above Mboko in Fizi. Soon after, a press release was circulated that announced the destitution of Rwasa and a new leadership, with the military wing headed by Nzabampema. According to the press release, Isidore Nibizi, an FNL politician and diplomat, became head of the political wing, although the precise nature of his involvement in the group has remained unclear. The same month, the FARDC launched important operations against the group, mobilizing a variety of Mai Mai forces in Uvira.

These operations, as well as a string of other incidents with Mai Mai groups in the course of 2013––including the FNL’s killing of Mai Mai commander Mathias (ex-Baleke group)––contributed to making the group more inward-looking and Burundi-oriented in terms of operations. Relations with the FDLR also deteriorated at the end of 2013, and the group presently only continues significant collaboration with the tiny Mai Mai group of Nyerere and possibly that of Fujo, after the latter returned to the bush at the end of 2014. At the same time, the FNL/Nzabampema stepped up recruitment in Burundi, reportedly training groups of combatants in shifts, and infiltrating them back into Burundi. It also intensified its cross-border attacks on Burundi, particularly in the Rukoko reserve, and against FDN troops in Kiliba. This activism demonstrated the relative ineffectiveness of the FDN in Uvira, which began to draw increasing attention and criticism from international and local actors, leading to their withdrawal in October 2014. This gave the FNL/Nzabampema greater freedom of movement, and cross-border operations continued. In response to an attack in the Rukoko reserve in November 2014, the FDN began heavy-handed operations to quell FNL activity in this part of Burundi, including by targeting the cattle-owners and herders they believe are important sources of support to the FNL.

Rationale and possible effects of the recent military operations

The presence of the FNL/Nzabampema has undeniably been a source of insecurity in Uvira, in particular since the launch of regular FARDC operations against them in 2013. Furthermore, its shifting alliances with other armed groups in the area has contributed to the volatility of the political-military landscape. However, due to its growing isolation over the course of 2014, the FNL became less important within the overall dynamics of conflict and violence in Uvira. The main drivers of these dynamics are the presence of dozens of tiny Mai Mai groups and self-defence militias, competing political-economic elites, interlocking inter and intra-community conflicts and rampant banditry. The FNL/Nzabampema presently weighs in heavier on developments within the Burundian context, both through its ongoing cross-border attacks and the symbolic place it occupies in Burundian politics. To some sympathizing with the ideology and movement of Palipehutu/FNL, which is a broader group than the adherents of the various parties currently operating under the FNL label, the FNL/Nzabampema represents a last resort in an increasingly authoritarian environment.

There are some indications that the Nzabampema group employs the same ideology as its FNL precursors, like resistance against oppression and ascetic Christian values––in the past the Adventist church played an important role. Indeed, Nzabampema is reported to maintain strict standards of discipline among his troops, who are forbidden to drink or engage in relations with local women. Nonetheless, this relative ideological continuity does not guarantee support from FNL supporters, the majority of whom have distanced themselves from Nzabampema. This includes Rwasa, who returned to the political scene in Burundi in August 2013, and intends to stand as a presidential candidate in this year’s elections.

This political dimension is important to take into consideration in efforts to dismantle the group. It is not clear to what extent the recent FARDC/MONUSCO attack has done so, and whether it is part of a wider, multi-dimensional strategy to address the FNL. For MONUC/MONUSCO, the FNL has generally had a low priority, resulting in the absence of a consistent policy. In recent years, DDRRR has not tried to sensitize FNL fighters to voluntarily disarm or repatriate them, although it has engaged in such activities in the past. At present, MONUSCO hands Burundian combatants over to the FARDC, which extradites them to Burundi. Yet, there is no transparent mechanism for monitoring returned combatants, and there are serious concerns about the treatment of repatriated FNL fighters. This is likely to undermine individual voluntary surrenders. MONUSCO has also chosen for an ostrich policy towards the FDN presence in Kiliba, admitting only after growing media attention that the Burundian military was present on Congolese soil. Furthermore, it has rarely been involved in military operations against the FNL, only providing limited support to the FARDC in the framework of the Kamilisha Usalama operations in 2013 and 2014. However, like the current operations, it is not clear to what extent these have been combined with political or diplomatic instruments, and what prospects the group are offered in case of surrender.

Given the previous low priority given to the FNL, the recent operations, which have also targeted a number of Mai Mai groups in Uvira, came somewhat as a surprise. While it appears that they had been planned for a long time, as part of Kamilisha Usalama II, MONUSCO has presented the offensive as a precursor to  operations against the FDLR, rather than an objective in its own right. However, apart from demonstrating resolve, it does not appear the operations had a direct effect on the FDLR in South Kivu or were needed to attack them in the future. There are also questions about links to the situation in Burundi, in particular the fighting in Cibitoke, where at the end of December 2014, a group of an estimated 200 unidentified fighters were intercepted supposedly on their way to the Kibira forest, leading to days of heavy fighting with many casualties on the rebel side. While it is still unclear what happened, some sources have raised the possibility that there were FNL/Nzabampema fighters among this group who had been informed of the upcoming operations and therefore tried to flee.

Even if the FNL was not involved in the Cibitoke events, the heavy security measures taken in their wake, in addition to those already implemented in the Rukoko reserve, are likely to have weakened FNL/Nzabampema support networks and complicated the group’s operations in Burundi. In combination with the MONUSCO/FARDC attack, the full impact of which remains at this point unclear, it appears that the group has been weakened. Yet in a recent declaration a spokesperson stated the group is not ready to surrender, and will continue their fight against the CNDD-FDD government which “has always treated them like second-rank citizens”. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the operations will affect the resolve of the group’s support networks, however small-scale, with sympathizers both in Burundi and the diaspora likely to continue underground activities. Much will depend on the evolvement of the political climate in Burundi, and how the upcoming elections will unfold, including the fate of Rwasa’s candidacy and respect for civil liberties. At the same time, when MONUSCO support to the FARDC stops and other priorities take over, new space can be created for regrouping in the DR Congo. In the absence of a multidimensional regional approach to the FNL/Nzabampema, the long-term contribution of the recent operations to dismantling the group is far from guaranteed.

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Four reasons military operations against the FDLR will have limited success

The deadline provided by the United Nations, the ICGLR and SADC for the FDLR to demobilize expired on Friday. Almost immediately, the UN and Congolese army launched military operations ––not against the FDLR, but against the FNL, Burundian rebels who have several small bases in the Rusizi Plain in South Kivu. The UN said that this attack was a way of clearing the ground for a broader offensive against the FDLR in the coming days.

It is not clear why the UN and the Congolese felt that it was necessary to get rid of the FNL bases first––the FDLR are located in the mountains overlooking the Rusizi Plain; there are ways to get to their positions without going through the FNL positions. Nonetheless, the Congolese army and its UN counterparts have been planning operations against the FDLR for several months, and we are likely to smell more gunpowder in coming days, probably after the meetings of regional heads of state, to be held in Luanda next week.

And yet, despite all this talk about military operations, here are some reasons why they are not––at least, not alone––going to produce a solution:

  1. The Congo is vast and the FDLR is no mood to fight: The FDLR is not like the M23 or other Congolese armed groups––it will not stand and fight, and has no sense of "homeland", at least not in the Congo. The FDLR operates over an area roughly the size of Belgium or Maryland, and covered in impenetrable forests, marshes, and ragged mountains. Attacking the group is like squeezing a balloon: the FDLR will simply run;
  2. The United Nations peacekeeping force is divided internally: Yes, the mission has said on many occasions it will launch operations against the FDLR. But it recently moved the HQ of its Force Intervention Brigade––the South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops who have a more aggressive mandate––to Beni, where a string of massacres has killed more than 200 since October. A senior MONUSCO commander recently suggested, in private, that the situation of Beni is of much greater humanitarian concern than the FDLR. In addition, regional tensions between Rwanda on one side and Tanzania and South Africa on the other have complicated matters. The Tanzanian government has been reluctant to move against the FDLR, going so far as to call them "freedom fighters," while the South African government has also dragged its feet;
  3. It's the Congolese population that suffers from military operations against the FDLR: A lot. The UN uncovered evidence in 2009 that the FDLR used the massacre of civilians as a means of pressure against the international community. It could do so again. In 2009, almost a million people were displaced in the space of a year during ham-fisted operations by the Congolese and Rwandan armies. To minimize the backlash, operations would have to be extremely targeted, and it isn't clear whether the UN and the Congolese army have that sort of special forces capability;
  4. There is no exit valve for FDLR commanders: Few are the rebellions that are defeated by military might alone. Almost all combine a carrot and stick. In this case, the only option that senior FDLR commanders have to fighting is to return to Rwanda, where they face a life of poverty and possible arrest. There is a well-oiled demobilization program for rank-and-file combatants, but only ad hoc arrangements for individual commanders. 
This latter point is no longer written in stone. Over the past year, real momentum has finally built around the idea of providing a third country of exile to FDLR who are not war criminals (an idea that myself and others promoted as far back as 2005). The idea is to to facilitate the departure––without amnesty, of course––of FDLR commanders who are not on any list of génocidaires or war criminals, probably over 80-90% of all senior officers, to other African countries. Senior diplomats from the region have begun working on this, although the Rwandan government has insisted that military operations must precede progress on this. To my mind, it isn't clear that Rwanda has the standing to block this option, especially if the people concerned are not on any representative list of war criminals––after all, it is Congolese citizens, not Rwandans, who are currently suffering under the FDLR occupation. 

All of this is not to say military operations are not part of the solution. There most likely are, although they should be much better planned-out than in the past. But they are not the whole solution, and that should be recognized. 

Guest Blog: Politics and Business Intersect in String of North Kivu Killings

Cemetery for the 23 victims of the Eringeti attacks of October 17, 2014 (Photo: Rachel Sweet)
This is a guest blog by Rachel Sweet, a PhD candidate at Northwestern University. Her research focuses on the politics of armed groups in eastern Congo, in particular on how preexisting business and bureaucratic practices influence armed group organization.  

The escalation of violence in North Kivu’s Beni territory has grown increasingly worrisome since initial massacres in October. Not only has the kind of violence become more brutal––including scenes of decapitation and disembowelment that were previously uncommon in Beni and a shift toward attacks in daylight––but the number of victims has grown dramatically.  Sources in civil society suggest that over 200 civilians have been killed in the past three months.

And yet, the identity of the perpetrators is unclear and layered in controversy. Most reports have pointed to the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), a rebel group that originated in Uganda in the 1990s.  Initially, this appears to have been accurate––the first attacks on Ngadi, Eringeti, and Oicha can be attributed to the ADF’s need to reinvent itself in the aftermath of Operation Sokola.  This joint offensive of FARDC and MONUSCO devastated the group’s camps and reduced it to an estimated 100-200 members divided across different bands, according to senior MONUSCO analysts.   The operation disrupted access to arms and ammunition, which can explain the shift to machetes as tools of violence. It also fractured relations between the ADF and the local population, which could have motivated increased brutality toward civilians.  Residents of Beni cite ADF attacks against civilians as reprisals for having provided FARDC and MONUSCO information on ADF camps, or as punishment for local combatants who defected or businesspersons who defaulted on payments to the group (as other armed groups, the ADF had become important local moneylenders).  As such, attacks form the culmination of a pattern of reprisal attacks by the ADF in response to military operations, such as Operation Rwenzori in 2010, and to severed social ties, as seen in the summer 2013 Watalinga attacks.

Yet, increasingly the keys to understanding violence will not be simply body counts or the actors behind it.  Instead, analysis should focus not on what triggered the onset of violence but on how it is repurposed and who benefits from the environment of uncertainty that it creates.  Specifically, the attacks have set in place three dynamics that create new incentives for insecurity distinct from the initial rounds of violence: political maneuvering, parallel mobilization, and linkages between otherwise distinct social tensions.  These dynamics are compounded by the uncertainty surrounding the motives and authors behind attacks.   

Political Maneuvering

To understand attacks, we should start by asking: Who benefits from the uncertainty surrounding the killings? Uncertainty provides a political resource for interests not immediately linked with violence to expand and redirect the threat. Ambiguity around the ADF stems from its comparative isolation from civilians vis-à-vis other Mayi Mayi and the unclear nature of its links with radical Islam.  It is heightened as new conflict actors commit attacks.  Uncertainty expands the breadth of misinformation that can circulate, heightens the perceived threat posed to civilians, and allows violence to be more readily repurposed for other ends.
Specifically, violence in Beni creates an opportunity to settle ongoing political scores that are not directly linked to attacks.  Since 1999, the RCD/K-ML, led by Mbusa Nyamwisi has politically dominated the Beni and Lubero territories of the Grand Nord, first as an insurgency (1999-2003), and since then as a political party.  When Mbusa joined the political opposition in 2011, North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku broke from the RCD/K-ML to form his own political party, BUREC, that remained allied with President Kabila’s PPRD.  Though Mbusa left Congo in 2012 and was dismissed as national parliamentarian in 2013, he remains embroiled with Paluku in a dispute for leadership in the Beni and Lubero territories that comprise the Grand Nord.  Julien Paluku and allied politicians, including Beni’s PPRD mayor Nyonyi Bwana Kawa, struggle for popular influence in the Grand Nord against what PPRD officials estimate is an 80% support rate for Mbusa’s RCD/K-ML.

The violence has provided PPRD and BUREC an opportunity for political gain.  Targets of armed violence have tended to remain the most vulnerable groups of civilians, with attacks generally focusing on villages rather than town centers. Yet the state’s response has focused on higher-profile authorities and economic interests who have withheld support for PPRD.  In a press conference in November, Julien Paluku denounced Mbusa for using his M23 connections to support the ADF.  The same month, pro-RCD/K-ML chefs des cellules and chefs des quartiers in Beni town were replaced with PPRD rivals, and plans were laid to replace the more powerful chefs de commune.  This political reshuffling has far-reaching consequences. For example, chefs des communes control areas extending to Virunga national park and the Semuliki valley that are home to a number of militias.  One chef targeted for replacement reportedly collects informal taxes from markets in Beni where the ADF is influential and sends revenue to “our brothers living in the forest.” If these support networks are disrupted, militias may retaliate with increased coercion.

Remains of the monument of Joseph Kabila, damaged by protestors, at Round Point Kabila in Beni town

The attacks have also created new economic incentives for instability.  Political power in the Grand Nord is largely exercised through the ability to control and confer private benefits in lucrative import-export trade.  The area’s powerful business interests hold considerable political sway, with RCD/K-ML leaders recalling how Butembo-based businesses organized Mbusa’s 2011 parliamentary campaign.  To shift support from political competitors and consolidate control over parallel economies, the PPRD has linked pro-RCD/K-ML businesses to recent violence and cracked down on their operations.  The intelligence service has kept a close watch on prominent business owners, and in November arrested Muhindo Kasebere and Maman Getou, the largest business operators in Kasindi and Beni, as they attempted to cross the border to Uganda. 

These and other high-level arrests that warn against relations with the RCD/K-ML can intensify instability by incentivizing businesses to retool connections with local militias.  Large businesses in the Grand Nord rely on militias to evade taxes and informal fees. The prevalence of these ties led a community leader in Butembo to joke that “if you have $20,000, you can create your own Mayi Mayi.”  The UN Group of Experts has documented some of these linkages, including Kasebere’s supply of arms to combatants such as Hilaire Kombi, who likely remain loyal to Mbusa.  While these militias serve more as instruments of fiscal evasion than forces of insecurity against civilians, recent crackdowns can create a need to repurpose these militias toward more coercive ends.  Even if businesses follow PPRD instructions to withdraw support from the RCD/K-ML, they may shore up armed groups as outlets to maintain autonomy from Kinshasa to compensate for reduced political independence.

In the meantime, the RCD/K-ML benefits from instability by demonstrating that other politicians are unable to secure the Grand Nord in Mbusa’s absence.  Doing so creates a pathway for his return to Congo politics. The RCD/K-ML has responded to attacks by denouncing Governor Julien Paluku as a “génocidaire against the Yira [Nande] community.”  Though this is not a credible claim, the rhetoric raises the stakes of choosing political sides and increases the perceived threat among civilians.  Members at all levels of the party’s hierarchy denounce Paluku for collaborating with the ADF via General Mundos, the commander of the Sokola operations.  

Monument of Enoch Nyamwisi at the central roundabout in Beni town, decapitated by protestors

Parallel Mobilization

Initial waves of violence have also spurred a range of parallel mobilizations.  These include “night patrols” in Beni and Oicha towns that are armed with machetes, contribute to a more militarized environment, and have been reported for crimes including rape.  Youth from Oicha are reportedly leaving the town to join preexisting militias such as Mayi Mayi Vurondo. 

Copycat groups mimicking ADF techniques have emerged.  Local analysts in direct communication with armed groups report that the ADF was not behind several recent attacks, including killings in Beni town and Vema.  Residents of villages including Mayi Moya identify assailants not as ADF but as youth from their community who left for the forest following the initial attacks in Beni territory. Few residents in Beni view the ADF as the exclusive authors of attacks.  Locals discuss the potential links between Hillarie Kombi’s former soldiers who remain in the Semuliki valley or ex-M23 networks with the violence.  MONUSCO analysts have identified a group of at least 100 combatants in Beni emulating ADF tactics.  

Copycat violence is not unusual for Beni, where other Mayi Mayi, such as Hilaire Kombi’s combatants who were linked to the M23 insurgency, have mimicked ADF’s signature kidnapping tactics.  More recently, copycat groups exploit and expand the uncertainty around ADF origins and motives by leaving notes at sites of attacks invoke grandiose connections to international terror and that implicate MONUSCO in the violence. 

While is clear that more than one group has been involved in the recent massacres, the ADF label provides a convenient pretext to settle preexisting, often unrelated, scores.  Civilians in Beni have been able to brandish the ADF name to denounce, arrest, or harass their rivals.  And as the national intelligence agency has increased its activity, information provision has become source of revenue and leverage.  Civil society and the PPRD have begun efforts to start a hotline for receive texts with information on suspicious activity.  Security measures also provide opportunities for extortion on the part of low-level bureaucrats.  Roadblocks and taxation points have multiplied, with officials becoming more forceful in the appropriations of rents. 

This parallel vigilante mobilization and the trade in information create new sources of power linked to the violence that further destabilize the region.

Links between Social Tensions

Finally, uncertainty surrounding attacks provides an opportunity to project other tensions onto the violence. This is particularly true for tensions between the demographically dominant Nande and Kinyarwanda speakers in the area.  Reports of Kinyarwanda speakers among assailants circulate in Beni and have resulted in violent reprisals, including the killing and burning of a Hutu in October.  Ongoing migrations of thousands of Hutu from Masisi to Eringeti and Irumu via Beni––which have been taking place for years––have been increasingly publicized over recent months.  These migrations are not directly related to the violence–most migrants reach Boga from Eringeti via Bunia rather than the more direct Kainama route through ADF territory, indicating a lack of direct connection with attacks.  And ethnic targeting is an ill fit for interpreting the violence—attacks do not map onto ethnic motives, and many combatants within the ADF and copycat groups are themselves Nande. Yet increased reporting on migrations by local radio stations alongside news of attacks has introduced an ethnic lens to popular perceptions of insecurity. Shifting interpretations of violence to group-level threats expands incentives for counter-mobilization and leaves civilians more prone to manipulation.

Politicians have accentuated these dynamics.  The governor of North Kivu and mayor of Beni are accused of facilitating Hutu migrations by providing travel authorizations.  The RCD/K-ML’s description of Governor Paluku as a génocidaire against the Nande, and discussions of Paluku’s involvement with migrations, reifies group-based interpretations of conflict.  Similarly, Paluku’s reminders of Mbusa’s M23 connections aim to discredit his rival by associating him with external interests that threaten the Nande.   Identifying attacks with longstanding social cleavages raises the stakes of violence.

Together, political maneuvering, parallel mobilization, and links between social cleavages create new incentives to escalate violence, with few interests for de-escalation. Lulls in violence should not be confused with lulls in the underlying dynamics that motivate and transform violence.

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

With deadline fast approaching, politics and logistics get in the way of operations against the FDLR

Congolese Minister of Information Lambert Mende, on a visit to FDLR combatants in Kanyabayonga with Deputy SRSG for MONUSCO Abdallah Wafi/Courtesy of Radio Okapi
It has been exactly one year since Martin Kobler, the head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo, tweeted: ""The number one priority for MONUSCO is now the FDLR." It has now been nine months since a regional organization, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, called for a military offensive against the FDLR. As previously noted here, the UN and foreign diplomats had seen the attack on the FDLR as part of the grand bargain aimed at bringing an end to the regional dimension of war in the country: First get rid of the M23, then deal with the FDLR. 

To date, no real operations against the FDLR have taken place. Why the delay?

On 2 July 2014, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and ICGLR decided to give the FDLR six months to voluntarily disarm. The FDLR sent some 200 soldiers and an equal number of dependents to a military camp in Kisangani as a gesture of goodwill, although many of those soldiers were not fit to fight anyway. That goodwill has now in theory come to an end––and yet, with the 2 January 2015 looming, it is likely that we will see little immediate concerted action against the group.

There are two main reasons for this. The first is political. Relations between countries in the region have soured in recent years, and Tanzania and South Africa––the two largest contributors to the UN's new Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)––are eager to use play the FDLR card against Rwanda. For South Africa, the resentment stems from the repeated assassination attempts against Rwandan opposition members on South African soil, including during the middle of the World Cup in 2010. Pretoria is also keen on securing access to hydroelectric power in the Congo through the construction of various parts of the Inga dam. Just in the past weeks, a blackout in Durban, President Jacob Zuma's home base, has cost their economy millions.

Tanzania's involvement is less straightforward. According to several Tanzanian officials, the animosity boils down to a personal dispute between Presidents Paul Kagame and Jakaya Kikwete. On 26 May 2013, Kikwete suggested in a speech at the African Union that Rwanda negotiate with its enemies, just as other countries in the region had done. This then unleashed a torrent of criticism from Kigali, ranging from a dismissive Kagame calling Kikwete's comments "utter nonsense" and "dancing on the graves of our people," to the simply obscene caricatures published on pro-government websites in Rwanda. There have also been suggestions, stemming from a WikiLeaks cable, that Kikwete's wife Salma is a cousin of former Rwandan President Habyarimana (a claim that many Tanzanians say is nonsense).

President Kikwete, carrying FDLR on his back/The Exposer, 22 July 2014
In return, Tanzanian officials have reportedly retorted that Kagame "will be whipped like a small boy" and have referred to the FDLR as freedom fighters. In recent meetings with Tanzanian officials, foreign diplomats report that the former have referred to all FDLR as refugees and depict the conflict in ethnic terms as Tutsi against Hutu. According to those same sources, the Tanzanian government is reluctant to authorize their troops to launch operations against the FDLR. A UN official, speaking under the condition of anonymity, suggested this was one of the reasons that the Tanzanians were being deployed against the ADF in North Kivu and not against the FDLR. (Not all Tanzanian officials, however, toe this line, and others insist that their troops will carry out UN orders regardless).

The other reason that military operations against the Rwandan rebels may be delayed is due logistical constraints. The UN has recently moved the HQ of its Force Intervention Brigade to Beni to counter attacks by the ADF rebellion, which––along with other, nebulous actors––may have killed up to 250 people since October. This means that its main fighting force has been tied down. While the entire peacekeeping force is supposed to participate in operations against armed groups, other contingents have been reticent to take risky, offensive action––as the Crisis Group documents in a new report released today. 

Nonetheless, UN officials say that they have been planning joint military operations against the FDLR with their Congolese counterparts for the past several weeks, and that they will try to launch operations following the January deadline. The FDLR, for their part, have told their contacts in the UN that they are planning to announce another goodwill gesture in order to stave off an attack. 

We will see in two-and-a-half weeks.

Monday, December 15, 2014

Fact-checking Kabila's State of the Union Address

Courtesy RTNC

This morning, Joseph Kabila delivered his annual state of the union address. Dressed in a black tie and suit––perhaps a sign of respect for the recent victims of massacres in the eastern Congo––Kabila's speech lasted for an hour and twenty minutes, in front of both houses of parliament, most accredited ambassadors, and most governors and ministers.

The highlights were well covered in the media, but defy simple sound bites: He will ask the United Nations peacekeeping mission to scale down, but says the country still needs them to deal with armed groups; and he pledged to uphold Congolese laws and hold elections, but didn't say anything about his own personal future or the timetable of the polls. The biggest applause––and the most quotable moments of the evening––came when he castigated foreign interference in the Congo. The two quotes here are:
Provided that it done in respect of our constitution, we are always willing to receive advise, opinions, and suggestions from our partners, but never orders.
We can ask ourselves about the legitimacy of certain compatriots to systematically call foreigners to settle the differences among Congolese, as if we didn't collectively have enough wisdom and maturity to do it ourselves.
But what about the rest of the 80 minutes of speech? We shouldn't fast-forward over them so quickly, as there were important, but also misleading moments. We fact-checked the main statements in the speech:

The political scene

  • The country has just seen the formation of a new government that represents most of "our political currents and social forces." SORT OF: Yes, the government includes a large majority of political parties represented in parliament, including the UFC, MLC, and a dissident UDPS member. But we don't know what a majority of Congolese themselves think of this government, and the Catholic church, civil society groups, and important opposition parties have been very critical;
  • Most of the recommendations of the concertations nationales are being carried out. IF MOST IS N/2+1, THEN PROBABLY NOT. The concertations produced hundreds of recommendations, including some that are being carried out, albeit slowly (e.g.: a census, holding local elections before national ones, get rid of foreign and national armed groups) but many others that are not (e.g.: a truth and reconciliation commission, universal health care, liberalize the insurance market, obligatory military service, electoral reforms to promote inclusion of women);
  • There is no political crisis in the Congo. YES, BUT DEPENDS ON WHO YOU ASK. A political scientist would probably back Kabila up, as national institutions are carrying out business as usual, albeit amidst much brouhaha. Opposition members or inhabitants of Beni would probably disagree.
  • More needs to be done to ensure gender parity in government. YES, BUT...President Kabila himself just presided over the formation of a new government with only 15% women, and none of his main advisers (except for his mother and sister) are women. Parliament is even worse, with less than 10% women, and every time the possibility of laws to enforce gender parity (which is required by the constitution) comes up, the political elite punts.
Administration and justice
  • The government has suppressed taxes along waterways and plans on doing so elsewhere. CORRECT. The government did ban 38 illegal taxes along lakes and rivers in July. Which raises the question why national agencies––including some that have no mandate to tax, like the army and police––were collecting these taxes in the first place;
  • The government will urgently accelerate the regrouping of far-flung villages so as to better provide services. WOW, REALLY? Villagization was never a great success in Ethiopia, Tanzania and, more recently, in Rwanda. And villagers might be interested in what services the government wants to provide them.
  • I exhort judges to live up to the creed of their profession and to pursue justice. This is obvious neither true nor false, but is stark contrast to his speech last year in which he said he would end impunity for racketeering and corruption. Here he just asks judges to be better, while omitting the public and military prosecutors that he can influence;  
  • We have set up a national program in support of micro finance, which will soon be present across the country. TRUE. The program exists, although it's not clear what they have done;
  • Mining has grown exponentially––copper production has increased from 7,200 tons in 2001 to 922,000 tons this year, cobalt from 1,200 tons to 76,000 tons, and gold from 12kg to 6,000 kg. TRUE. Of course, these figures are driven by the private sector, and Kabila probably can't claim all the credit, especially since his government has also overseen the fraudulent fire sale of at least $1,4 billion in mining assets;
  • The government's revenues from the mining sector are still small, but will increase once mining companies begin to declare profits. ABSOLUTELY. Yes, and this is important, as this will buoy state revenues considerably. 
  • We are investing in agriculture, including in an agro-industrial park in Bandundu, a fertilizer factory in Bas-Congo, and in rural service roads. MORE OR LESS. The park exists and the fertilizer factory is indeed supposed to open next year––their capacity and importance are still unclear. I am pretty sure that the rural service roads mentioned here were built mostly by donor money;
  • I grant particular attention to building Grand Inga and Zongo II dams, and repair the Inga I &II, Ruzizi, Tshopo, Nseke and Nzilo dams. WORDS MATTER. "Grant particular attention" does not really say much. Grand Inga is likely to take several decades to build, and little progress has been made in recent years, although Congo did recently sign a deal with South Africa. Inga I & II, Nseke and Nzilo have indeed, been repaired; I could not verify the other two; 
  • The airports of Kisangani, Kinshasa, Goma, and Lubumbashi are in middle of modernization. YES. They have begun work on all these airport. But they are far from finished. And, as for much of what he said about infrastructures, some of these are donor-funded;
  • We have bought 38 new locomotives for our train network, 20 from our own resources, and 21 will arrive in April 2015. SEEMS TO BE TRUE. See here and here;
  • Starting next year, we will have a national airline again. YES. This will be a partnership with Air France and KLM and will replace the LAC airline, which went bankrupt ten years ago;
Health and education
  • We have opened the Hôpital du Cinquantenaire, the Clinique Universitaire de Kisangani, and 44 health centers. TRUE, I THINK. The Hôpital de Cinquantenaire opened in March after years of delays and controversies over funding (it cost $100 million). A caveat for the local health centers: there haven't been any audits for quality, to my knowledge;
  • Our education budget has gone from 3% to 16% of the total budget in recent years, and we have built 500 of the scheduled 1,000 schools. YES. However, again, it is difficult to verify the number and quality of schools. And the proposed budget mentioned here is important, but one really has to look at what was really spent, which may be another issue;
  • The war is over. The main security risks that remain are foreign armed groups. NOT SO FAST. Yes, the M23 was defeated last year, and that was a big success. But conflict has escalated in Katanga and around Beni since then. Around 2,6 million people are displaced, a million more than at the end of the official peace process in 2006. And the importance of the ADF and FDLR should not make us lose sight of Congolese armed groups, who are far more numerous in terms of troops, and often just as deadly;

Sunday, December 7, 2014

Much-awaited government shuffle brings in opposition parties, bolsters Kabila's grasp on power

This post has been updated since it was initially published.

Over thirteen months after President Joseph Kabila said there would be a government of national cohesion, it's finally here. Announced close to midnight local time on national television, the government brings in part of the opposition, empowers the heads of political parties, and is aimed at bolstering Kabila's position ahead of his end-of-term wrangles and the upcoming electoral battles.

The government will still be heading by Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo, but if his first government was intended to champion technocracy, this one intends to keep an unruly political coalition intact. During Matata's first government, heads of political parties were largely banned from cabinet positions and were instead forced to send mostly competent delegates to occupy important ministries. Some were relative political neophytes––both deputy prime ministers came out of the shadows and were considered to be technocrats, and even Matata himself always seemed more comfortable arguing technicalities than in political networking. Several of the ministers were former university colleagues of Matata and there was a high degree of trust among a core of them. 

This government is different. Almost all of the leaders of the ruling coalition are present––Boshab (PPRD), Bahati (AFDC), Kamitatu (ARC), Mboso Nkodia (PSDC), Serufuli (UCP), Mende (CCU), Tshibanda (ULDC), as well as several others. This was most likely an effort to strengthen this coalition––which has always been unruly––ahead of the upcoming battles over the electoral calendar, the census, and possibly a constitutional revision, all of which are linked to speculation over Kabila's future when his last term expires in 2016. In other words, if Kabila wants to either change the constitution––an option that he has retreated from in recent months––or just delay the next elections, he will need political capital. This new government provides him with that––not dissimilar from the recent shuffle in the army, which created a legion of new positions to keep the senior officer corps happy.

At the same time, by placing political bigwigs in the cabinet, it will be harder for Matata to have his way. Not to say that he had been having an easy time, in any case––after a first year of some successes, the past year has seen stalled reforms and, according to foreign diplomats, an increase in corruption. "What else can you expect," one quipped recently, "if you tell ministers that they have to go, and then give them an entire year to fill their pockets on the way out?"

The highlights of the shuffle:
1. The opposition enters: After all, this was supposed to be a "government of national cohesion," bring together the opposition and ruling coalition. The two main parties that entered were the MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba and the UFC of Kengo wa Dondo: Thomas Luhaka (MLC) becomes Deputy Prime Minister for Post and Telecommunications, while Michel Bongongo (UFC) becomes State Minister for Budget. The MLC and UFC also obtain two smaller positions: the minister of industry and the vice-minister of international cooperation.
The MLC has the second-largest number of opposition seats in the national assembly (21), and while UFC has a paltry 4 seats, Kengo, the head of the senate, has played an oversized role in recent political events.
While other members of the opposition have entered––Daniel Madimba Kalonji of the UDPS and Jean Nengbangba Tshingbanga of RCD-K/ML––the first is member of a dissident faction of his party, and the latter's party has also split. It will also be interesting to see whether Thomas Luhaka, the secretary-general of the MLC who is now deputy prime minister, will receive the blessing of Jean-Pierre Bemba.
2. Political stalwarts bolstered: Almost all of the important ministries are now staffed by recognizable names, Congolese political heavyweights. This includes: 
  • Evariste Boshab (Deputy PM and Interior Minister, head of PPRD): Once Kabila's chief-of-staff and head of the national assembly from 2009-2012, he was also the biggest proponent of changing the constitution to give Kabila a third term;
  • Willy Makiashi (Deputy PM and Labor Minister, deputy head of PALU): Is now the secretary-general of one of Kabila's biggest electoral allies, the PALU party, which commands huge support in Bandundu province thanks to its patriarch, Antoine Gizenga;
  • Olivier Kamitatu (Minister of Planning, head of ARC): Always popular in diplomatic circles, he defected from Bemba's MLC in 2006. He held the same ministry from 2007-2012;
  • Eugène Serufuli (Minister of Rural Development, head of UPC): While this is not a top ministry, Serufuli's appearance in cabinet is important for North Kivu––he was governor there between 2000-2006 and via proxies was linked to much militia mobilization there within the Hutu community;
  • Emile Ngoy Mukena (Minister of Defense): The naming of this former Katangan governor means that the ministry of defense will have been in the hands of someone from northern Katanga since 2007;
Of course, other stalwarts have been kept on, such as Lambert Mende, Modeste Bahati, and Raymond Tshibanda.  
Interestingly, the natural resource portfolios that are so crucial to the regime have stayed in the hands of their previous, extremely loyal ministers: Crispin Atama (Oil), and Martin Kabwelulu (Mining). 
Finally, it is noteworthy to see that two critics of constitutional revision have been brought into government: Olivier Kamitatu and Bolengetenge Balela. The latter was the delegate chosen by the MSR party to voice its criticism about how the debate over constitutional reform had home about. Their presence in government seems to confirm suggestions that the president is backing away from a constitutional revision, at least for now. 
3.  Geographic, political, and gender distribution: This may appear trivial to outsiders, but geographic representation can easily become a lightning rod for critics. While I haven't been able to figure out where all the ministers are from, this is a first cut (omitting vice-ministers):
Bas-Congo (1); Bandundu (6); Equateur (4); Kasai-Oriental (3); Kasai-Occidental (2); Province Orientale (3); Maniema (4); North Kivu (3); South Kivu (3); Katanga (9).
Even if I'm still missing some names, it seems like Katanga is dramatically over-represented, while Bas-Congo has drawn the short straw.  Kabila has been having difficulty dealing with insurgents in his home base, so this may be a way of catering to those challenges. 
In addition, of the 38 prime ministers, deputy PMs, and ministers (not counting vice ministers), there are only 3 women.  
In terms of political parties, PPRD took the lion's share, with only four other parties––MSR, PALU, UFC, and MLC––controlling more than one seat: PPRD (10), MLC (3), PALU (2), MSR (2), UFC (2), ULDC (1), PA (1), CCU (1), ARC (1), PDC (1), UNADEF (1), MSC (1), UDCO (1), ADR (1), ECT (1), RDC-K/ML (1), PR (1), UDPS (1), UNAFEC (1), UCP (1). (Some party affiliations are still missing)

- Premier ministre: M. Augustin Matata Ponyo (Maniema, PPRD)

- Vice-Premier ministre, ministre de l’Intérieur et Sécurité : M. Evariste Boshab Mabudj (Kasai-Occidental, PPRD) 
- Vice-Premier ministre, ministre des PT-NTIC : M. Thomas Luhaka Losenjola (Kinshasa/Maniema, MLC)
- Vice-Premier ministre, ministre de l’Emploi, Travail : M. Willy Makiashi (Bandundu, PALU)

- Ministre d’Etat, ministre du Budget : M. Michel Bongongo (Equateur, UFC)
- Ministre d’Etat,  Décentralisation et Affaires coutumières : M. Salomon Banamuhere (North Kivu, PPRD)

- Affaires étrangères et Coopération internationale : M. Raymond Tshibanda (Kasai-Oriental, ULDC)
- Défense nationale, Anciens combattants et Réinsertion : M. Aimé Ngoy Mukena (Katanga, PPRD)
- Justice, Garde des sceaux et Droits humains : M. Alexis Thambwe Mwamba (Maniema, Independent)
- Portefeuille : Mme Louise Munga Mesozi (South Kivu, PPRD)
- Relation avec le Parlement : M. Tryphon Kin-Kiey Mulumba (Bandundu, PA)
- Communication et Médias : M. Lambert Mende Omalanga (Kasai-Oriental, CCU)
- Enseignement primaire, secondaire : M. Maker Mwangu Famba (Kasai-Occidental, PPRD)
- Plan et Révolution de la Modernité : M. Olivier Kamitatu (Bandundu, ARC)
- Fonction publique : M. Jean-Claude Kibala (South Kivu, MSR)
- Infrastructures et Travaux publics : M. Fridolin Kasweshi (Katanga, PPRD)
- Finances : M. Henry Yav Mulang (Katanga)
- Economie Nationale : M. Modeste Bahati Lukwebo (South Kivu, AFDC)
- Environnement et développement durable : M. Bienvenu Liyota Ndjoli (Kinshasa/Equateur, PDC)
- Commerce : Mme Kudianga Bayokisa (Bas-Congo)
- Industrie : M. Germain Kambinga (Kinshasa/Bandundu, MLC)
- Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage : M. Kabwe Mwewu (Katanga, UNADEF)
- Affaires foncières : M. Bolengetenge Balela (Province Orientale, MSR)
- Mines : M. Martin Kabwelulu (Katanga, PALU)
- Hydrocarbures : M. Crispin Atama Thabe (Province Orientale, PPRD)
- Energie et Ressources hydrauliques : M. Jeannot Matadi Nenga Ngamanda (Kinshasa/Bandundu, MSC)
- Culture et Arts : Banza Mukalay Nsungu (Katanga, UDCO)
- Tourisme : Elvis Mutiri wa Bashala (North Kivu, ADR)
- Santé publique : M. Félix Kabange Numbi (Katanga, ECT)
- Enseignement supérieur et universitaire : M. Théophile Mbemba Fundu (Bandundu, PPRD)
- Enseignement technique et professionnel : M. Jean Nengbangba Tshibanga (Province Orientale, RCD-K/ML)
- Aménagement du territoire, Urbanisme et Habitat : M. Omer Egbake (Equateur, MLC)
- Transports et voies de communication : M. Justin Kalumba Mwana Ngongo (Maniema, PR)
- Recherche scientifique et Technologie : M. Daniel Madimba Kalonji (Kasai-Oriental, UDPS)
- Genre, Famille et Enfant : Mme Bijou Kat (Katanga, UNAFEC)
- Petites et Moyennes entreprises et classe moyenne : M. Boongo Nkoy (Equateur, PPRD)
- Développement rural : M. Eugène Serufuli (North Kivu, UCP)
- Jeunesse, Sports et loisirs : M. Sama Lukonde Kyenge (Katanga)